We give a complete characterization of the secrecy capacity of arbitrarily varying wiretap channels (AVWCs) with correlated random coding. We apply two alternative strong secrecy criteria, which both lead to the same formula and which coincide in the case of deterministic codes. On the basis of the derived formula, we show that the correlated random coding secrecy capacity is continuous as a function of the AVWC. We show that the deterministic coding secrecy capacity of the AVWC either equals 0 or the correlated random coding secrecy capacity. For the case that only a weak secrecy criterion is applied, we derive a complete characterization of the corresponding secrecy capacity for deterministic codes. In the proof of the secrecy capacity formula for correlated random codes, we apply an auxiliary channel which is compound from the sender to the intended receiver and varies arbitrarily from the sender to the eavesdropper.
y n = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) and the eavesdropper receiving z n = (z 1 , . . . , z n ) given that x n = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) was input to the channel is contained in the family
W si (y i , z i |x i ) : s n = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ S n .
Here, S is the finite state set. Thus, any AVWC is determined by a family {W s (·, ·|·) : s ∈ S}.
Their generality allows various interpretations of mathematical models. In the AVWC case, one could regard the varying channel states as determined by nature. However, we will interpret them as the result of jamming from an intruder. So henceforth, we shall view the AVWC as a channel under two attacks at the same time: one passive (eavesdropping), one active (jamming).
We are not the first to study the capacity of the AVWC. Earlier approaches can be found in [4] , [16] , which however could not give a complete characterization of the secrecy capacity achieved by correlated random coding.
We give a complete characterization of this capacity. We also discuss the deterministic coding secrecy capacity.
Classical coding is deterministic: Before starting to communicate, sender and receiver agree on a procedure (f, φ) of data manipulation. Here, f is a possibly stochastic mapping from the messages to the channel inputs of a fixed blocklength, φ reverts channel outputs into messages. For transmission, each node separately executes its part of this procedure without relying on any further resources. What we call correlated random coding has been used as a mathematical tool ever since Shannon's 1948 paper [17] ; it is usually called random coding. Correlated random coding means that sender and receiver agree on a family of deterministic codes {(f γ , φ γ ) : γ ∈ Γ}. Before communication, a random experiment µ on Γ is performed. The outcome, say γ, is revealed to sender and intended receiver which then apply the deterministic code (f γ , φ γ ).
Used as a mathematical tool, a correlated random code usually serves to prove the existence of a good deterministic code in a class of deterministic codes. But this does not work for AVCs, as was shown by Ahlswede [1] . This is due to the fact that one cannot bound the average error of a deterministic code for an AVC in terms of the average error of the corresponding correlated random code. AVCs exhibit a dichotomy [1] : Their capacity for deterministic coding either equals their capacity for correlated random coding or it equals zero. Csiszár and Narayan have identified the distinguishing property [12] , called symmetrizability. Without the use of correlated random coding, a symmetrizable AVC is useless; no message transmission is possible.
Thus one is led to regarding correlated randomness as an additional resource for communication. This resource can make communication possible where it is impossible without. Of course, it is important that the jammer has no access to this resource. As we shall prove, a similar statement is true for the AVWC.
However, the main result of this paper is the characterization of the capacity for correlated random coding. We apply two strong secrecy criteria and show that the corresponding capacities for correlated random coding coincide.
The first of these criteria is that
be small, where M is the message chosen uniformly at random and Z sequence is s n and the deterministic code (f γ , φ γ ) has been selected. This criterion was applied in [4] , [16] . The second, stronger one requires
to be small. If the second criterion is satisfied, then transmission over the AVWC is secure even if the eavesdropper knows the realization of the correlated randomness. This means that we have to assume the active and passive attacks to be uncoordinated in the sense that the eavesdropper does not inform the jammer about its knowledge of the correlated randomness, if available.
The capacity formula we find for correlated random coding, which is the same for both criteria, is multi-letter.
This formula was found in [4] for special AVWCs where there is a "best channel to the eavesdropper". It is not clear whether a generally applicable single-letter formula exists at all.
The converse of the capacity result is a simple application of Fano's inequality. On the other hand, for its achievability part, we follow Ahlswede's strategy of deriving correlated random coding achievability results for AVCs from deterministic coding capacity results for compound channels. (In contrast to an AVC, a compound channel does not change its state during the transmission of a codeword.) This technique is known as the "robustification technique". Sender and receiver of an AVC randomly permute a deterministic code for a certain compound channel induced by the AVC and thus obtain a correlated random code with negligibly larger average error.
When applying the robustification technique to AVWCs, one has to take the secrecy criterion into account. As seen in [4] , this requires a "best channel to the eavesdropper" if one assumes the channel to the eavesdropper to be compound as well. The central idea of our proof is to introduce a mixed channel model, the compound-arbitrarily varying wiretap channel (CAVWC). This channel is compound from sender to intended receiver and varies arbitrarily from sender to eavesdropper. We derive the correlated random coding capacity of this channel with secrecy criterion (3), which remains the same when passing to the AVWC model. Therefore during robustification, only the reliability of transmission from sender to intended receiver has to be taken care of.
We prove the achievability result for the CAVWC by random coding. The criterion (3) is not treated directly.
Instead, we consider the total variation distance · between the eavesdropper's output probability distribution and the eavesdropper's output distribution conditional on a given message. If
tends to zero sufficiently fast for any message m, any state sequence s n and any code permutation π, then the validity of (3) can be inferred. Following Devetak [13] , we apply a Chernoff bound to show that the probability of those codes for which (4) is too large is doubly-exponentially small. Thus a deterministic code can be found for which (4) is small simultaneously for all possible parameters m, s n , π (note that there are more than exponentially many, but less than doubly-exponentially many permutations for a given blocklength).
It is interesting to note that for given upper bounds on (2) (or (3) ) and the average error, only a finite amount of correlated randomness is necessary to achieve the corresponding capacity, independently of the blocklength. This is a corollary of a result derived in [10] and substantially simplifies the coordination of sender and intended receiver inherent in the concept of correlated random coding.
An upper bound on the amount of common randomness is necessary even for the converse of the correlated random coding secrecy capacity theorem for the AVWC. The reason for this is that the use of correlated randomness prohibits a straightforward application of the data processing inequality. It can only be applied after conditioning on the correlated randomness. However, as the capacity formula does not contain such a conditioning, the range of the correlated randomness variable has to be upper-bounded. Once this is established, the influence of the conditioning can be shown to vanish asymptotically.
In [5] , the operational meaning of the secrecy criterion (2) has been discussed. One result is that the average error of any decoder the eavesdropper might apply has to tend to one if (2) tends to zero. Actually, this is already true if (4) tends to zero uniformly in the parameters. The natural question arises whether there is any difference between the two criteria. By analyzing an example of Bloch and Barros [7] , we show in a deterministic coding setting with one channel state that it generally is strictly stronger to require I(M ∧ Z) to be small (Z being the eavesdropper's output) than to require P Z (·) − P Z|M (·|m) to be small uniformly in the messages.
More precisely, the statement is that there exists a sequence of codes (one code per blocklength) for which I(M ∧ Z) remains larger than 1/2, whereas P Z (·) − P Z|M (·|m) tends to zero in the blocklength for all messages. This is only possible because the total variation decreases slowly, at the order of 1/n. If the decrease were faster, then the mutual information criterion would be satisfied as well. The proof of our capacity result works despite of that because it is possible to show the existence of a sequence of reliable codes such that the total variation converges to 0 at an exponential rate.
A second discussion concerns the robustness of the AVWC model. The correlated random coding secrecy capacity is continuous in the channel. This was essentially established in [9] . Thus small errors in the description of the family (1) do not have severe consequences on the capacity. For deterministic coding, we obtain that the set of all AVWCs with given in-and output alphabets decomposes into two disjoint sets, and that on each of these sets, the deterministic coding secrecy capacity is continuous. It remains
to be investigated what happens on the boundary between the two sets. We also observe that for the deterministic coding capacity, the critical channel seems to be that from the sender to the intended receiver, not the one to the eavesdropper. This view is supported by the fact that the secrecy criterion (3) guarantees secrecy even if the eavesdropper knows the correlated randomness. Recall that the jammer must not know this randomness. Otherwise, it might be able to symmetrize the channel from sender to intdended receiver and make any communication impossible.
The consequence of this conjectured feature of AVWCs is that more care has to be invested into finding the right model for the channel between sender and intended receiver than into that of the eavesdropper's channel. This is a positive result, as it will generally be easier to know the former than the latter channel.
Paper outline: To start with, in the second section, we set the notation and give basic definitions. In Section 3 we define the AVWC, the secrecy criteria we use with this model, and define the corresponding notions of achievable rates and secrecy capacities. We also state our main results concerning AVWCs. The subsequent section introduces the CAVWC also mentioned in the introduction. The secrecy criteria are defined as well as achievable rates and secrecy capacities. In Section 5 we justify why it is possible not to directly prove the secrecy criteria formulated in terms of mutual information, but instead to consider the total variation distance between certain output distributions.
The longest section, Section 6, contains the core of the paper: the proof of the achievability part of the coding theorem for the CAVWC. This section starts with its own outline, so we do not go into the details here. The achievability part of the correlated random coding theorem for the AVWC is derived from the achievability part of the coding theorem for the CAVWC in Section 7. Section 8 contains the converses. Section 9 contains the analysis of the example of Bloch and Barros mentioned above, showing that the secrecy criterion of small mutual information between the message and the eavesdropper's output generally is stronger than to require a uniformly small total variation distance between the output distribution and the output distribution when conditioned on any message.
We also justify why it is possible in our case to go from the total variation criterion to the mutual information criterion. Section 10 discusses aspects of the robustness of the AVWC model and the continuity of the secrecy capacity functions. In the appendix, we prove the dichotomy of the deterministic coding secrecy capacity of the AVWC: either it equals 0 or the correlated random coding secrecy capacity.
II. NOTATION AND BASIC DEFINITIONS
Logarithms denoted by log are taken to the base 2; correspondingly, we set exp(x) = 2 x . The cardinality of a finite set A is written |A|. For a subset E of A, the indicator function 1 E assumes the value 1 for arguments contained in E and 0 else. For n-tuples contained in A n , we write x n := (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ A n .
The set of probability measures on the finite set A is denoted by P(A). For p ∈ P(A), we define p ⊗n ∈ P(A n )
by p ⊗n (x n ) := i p(x i ). For a finite set B and a stochastic matrix W : A → P(B) and p ∈ P(A), we define the probability measure pW ∈ P(B) by pW (b) = a∈A p(a)W (b|a). We will mostly write entropy, conditional entropy and mutual information as functions of the involved probability measures and stochastic matrices. For example, we set
In some places, however, we shall also use the more common random variable notation.
A positive measure on A is a vector (µ(a)) a∈A with µ(a) ≥ 0 for all a ∈ A. The total variation distance of two positive measures µ, ν on A is defined by µ − ν := a∈A |µ(a) − ν(a)|.
For a sequence x n = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ A n and a ∈ A, the number N (a|x n ) indicates the number of coordinates x i of x n with x i = a. The type of x n is the probability measure q ∈ P(A) defined by q(a) := N (a|x n )/n. The set of possible types of sequences of length n is denoted by P n 0 (A). For δ > 0 and p ∈ P(A), we define the typical
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For δ > 0, a stochastic matrix W : A → P(B) and an element x n of A n , we define the conditionally typical set T n W,δ (x n ) as the set of those y n ∈ B n satisfying the two conditions
III. ARBITRARILY VARYING WIRETAP CHANNELS
Let A, B, C, S be finite sets. For every s ∈ S, let a stochastic matrix W s : A → P(B) and another stochastic matrix V s : A → P(C) be given. For a number n and x n ∈ A n , y n ∈ B n , s n ∈ S n , define
We denote the family {W n s n :
z n ∈ C n and denote the corresponding family {V n s n : s n ∈ S n , n = 1, 2, . . .} by V. We sometimes prefer to write
is called the state set of (W, V).
Remark 1:
One checks easily that the representation of an AVWC as a pair (W, V) is possible without losing generality. In general, any state s ∈ S together with an input a ∈ A will lead to a joint output distribution U s (·, ·|a).
But the performance of any of the codes defined below is measured with respect to the marginal output distributions W s (·, ·|a) and V s (·, ·|a). Thus for the framework treated in this paper, all AVWCs with the same marginals W and V are equivalent. A deterministic (n, J n )-code K n for the AVWC (W, V) consists of a stochastic encoder E : {1, . . . , J n } → P(A n ) and a collection of mutually disjoint sets {D j ⊂ B n : 1 ≤ j ≤ J n }. We abbreviate J n := {1, . . . , J n }. A code K n with encoder E defines stochastic matrices EW n s n :
The average error of K n is given by e(K n ) := max
October 30, 2014 DRAFT Definition 2: A non-negative number R S is an achievable secrecy rate for deterministic codes for the AVWC
lim inf
Here, p Jn denotes the uniform distribution on J n . The secrecy capacity of (W, V) is the supremum of all achievable secrecy rates R S and is denoted by C S (W, V).
Note the different roles the families W and V play. W is an Arbitrarily Varying Channel (AVC) from a sender with alphabet A to a receiver with alphabet B. Messages are supposed to be sent over this AVC in such a way that only a small, asymptotically negligible average error is incurred. This is reflected in condition (5). However, this communication is subject to an additional secrecy condition. An eavesdropper obtains a noisy version of the sender's channel inputs via the AVC V. Condition (7) guarantees secrecy.
for the AVWC (W, V) is given by a family of (n, J n )-codes {K n (γ) : γ ∈ Γ n } together with a probability distribution µ n on Γ n . The average error e(K ran n ) is defined as
One defines µ n EV n s n analogously. In the case of correlated random codes, we consider two secrecy criteria. This leads to as many different notions of achievable rate. We again denote the uniform distribution on J n by p Jn .
Definition 3:
A non-negative number R S is called an achievable secrecy rate for correlated random codes for
The supremum of all achievable secrecy rates for correlated random codes is called the secrecy capacity of (W, V)
for correlated random codes and denoted by C S,ran (W, V). ∞ n=1 of correlated random (n, J n , Γ n , µ n )-codes such that (8) and (9) hold and such that
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The supremum of all enhanced achievable secrecy rates for correlated random codes is called the enhanced secrecy capacity of (W, V) for correlated random codes and denoted byĈ S,ran (W, V).
Remark 5:
It is immediately clear that C S,ran (W, V) ≥Ĉ S,ran (W, V).
The secrecy capacities for correlated random codes are characterized by a multi-letter formula, extending the results of [4] . We set
Remark 6: It is shown exactly as in [5] , using Fekete's lemma [15] , that the limit on the right-hand side of (12) indeed exists. Further note the equality max
This equality is due to the convexity of mutual information in the channel. Remark 7: For given k, the cardinality of U can be restricted to |A| k . This can be proven almost exactly as in the proof of [11, Theorem 17.11] . The minimum and maximum operations do not pose any problem due to their being convex/concave. Note that the bound for fixed k does not give a general upper bound on the cardinality of the auxiliary alphabet U. The bound could still be helpful in calculations if one knows from other arguments that there exists a k 0 such that, for k ≥ k 0 ,
is sufficiently close to R * S (W, V). Theorem 8: For the AVWC (W, V), we havê
More precisely, for any R S < R * S (W, V), a sequence of (n, J n , Γ n , µ n )-codes K ran n can be chosen which in addition to (9) satisfies the following: For sufficiently large n and every s n ∈ S n , there exist a finite measure Θ s n on C n and β 1 , β 2 > 0 depending on the channel such that
According to Section V, inequality (14) implies that there exist β 3 , β 4 > 0 such that for large n max
where U s n : Γ n × {1, . . . , J n } → Z n is the stochastic matrix defined by
So (14) implies more than just the enhanced secrecy criterion. We show in Section IX that this is true only because of the exponential decrease of the total variation distance in (14) .
Note that the definitions allow every kind of correlated randomness as long as it is finitely supported. In the achievability proof of Theorem 8, we shall see that the uniform distribution on a set of cardinality n! is sufficient, where n is the blocklength of the code. The size of this set can still be reduced. A central observation here is the equality of the two secrecy capacities for correlated random codes, whose effect is that we may without loss of generality assume that the correlated random codes we are dealing with are secure in every deterministic component code. Thus to decrease the size of Γ n , i. e. of the correlated randomness, of a correlated random (n, J n , Γ n , µ n )-code
which has a small average error.
This is a typical problem from the theory of AVCs without secrecy constraints. The first of these results is due to
Ahlswede [1] . Formulated in our terminology and taking the secrecy constraints into account, it reads as follows.
Lemma 9:
The correlated randomness necessary to achieve any rate belowĈ S,ran (W, V) and C S,ran (W, V) can be assumed to be a uniform distribution on the set {1, . . . , ⌈n 1+ε ⌉}, for any ε > 0 and sufficiently large n. In this case, however, an exponential decrease of the average error as in (13) cannot be guaranteed any more.
An even stronger result has been found recently. Its essence is that every secrecy rate
is achievable with no more than a finite amount of correlated randomness, given arbitrary upper bounds on the average error and the "information leakage". We strengthen the statement of the result from [10] in order to be able to prove Theorem 12 by replacing the secrecy criterion by the requirement (14) . This can be done because in upper-bounding the size of the correlated randomness, only the average error is relevant, and it trivially follows that the smaller correlated random code saitsfies (14) from the fact that the original code satisfies (14) .
Lemma 10: Let λ ∈ (0, 1) and δ ∈ (0, 1). Then for every R S <Ĉ S,ran (W, V) there exists a sequence (K
of correlated random (n, J n , Γ n , µ n )-codes and a positive integer L such that for every ε > 0 and large blocklengths n and for every s n there exists a finite measure Θ s n on C n such that
µ n can be chosen as the uniform distribution on Γ n .
See [10] for the proof. Note that L depends on δ and λ, it cannot be chosen universally. However, finite correlated randomness is sufficient for all positive error and secrecy bounds, no matter how small they are chosen.
The relation between the deterministic coding secrecy capacity of an AVWC and its correlated randomness coding secrecy capacity is not completely clear. To understand the corresponding theorem, we need a definition which is central to the analysis of deterministic coding both for AVCs and AVWCs.
Definition 11:
The AVC W is called symmetrizable if there exists a stochastic matrix σ : A → S such that for every a, a
Proof: See appendix.
Remark 13:
Assume that we apply a weak secrecy criterion for deterministic codes, i. e. that we require
instead of (7), and denote the corresponding maximal achievable rate by C 
This is also shown in the proof of Theorem 12 in the appendix. (Note that it follows from the converse of the proof of Theorem 8 that weak versions of C S,ran (W, V) andĈ S,ran (W, V) coincide with their strong counterparts.)
Due to Theorem 8, it is allowed to replace C S,ran (W, V) byĈ S,ran (W, V). Moreover, it should be mentioned that the second part of Theorem 12 crucially depends on S being finite. To embed it into its context, we also mention the deterministic coding capacity of AVCs found by Csiszár and Narayan [12] . I(p, W q ).
IV. A MIXED COMPOUND-ARBITRARILY VARYING WIRETAP CHANNEL
To establish Theorem 8, we use Ahlswede's robustification technique [2] . It was developed to turn deterministic codes for compound channels into correlated random codes for AVCs. It has already been noted in [4] that this technique can also be applied to compound and arbitrarily varying wiretap channels. The difference of this paper's approach is that the channel from sender to eavesdropper will always be arbitrarily varying. Therefore it is no longer necessary to assume the existence of a "best channel to the eavesdropper", i. e. a q * ∈ P(S) such that all V q are degraded versions of V q * .
We now formalize the idea of having a compound channel from A to B and an arbitrarily varying channel from A to C. Let R be a compact set. Let ρ be a continuous mapping from R to the set of stochastic matrices with input alphabet A and output alphabet B. Thus ρ defines a compact set {W ρ(r) : r ∈ R} of stochastic matrices.
Note that here, in contrast to the AVC situation, the channel state remains constant over time. This defines a compound channel W ρ := {W n ρ(r) : r ∈ R, n = 1, 2, . . .}. Together with the family V from the previous section, we obtain the mixed compound-arbitrarily varying wiretap channel (CAVWC)
We apply (n, J n )-codes for message transmission over (W ρ , V). The main difference to the previous section is the definition of the average error. For the (n, J n )-code K n , it is defined as 
The supremum of all achievable secrecy rates is called the secrecy capacity of (W ρ , V) and denoted by C S (W ρ , V).
We are actually interested in a stronger, "enhanced" form of secrecy. This is because we mainly consider CAVWCs as an auxiliary channel model. We would like to exploit the achievability part of a coding theorem for CAWCs to find rates that are achievable for the AVWC by correlated random codes. As mentioned above, the way to do this is Ahlswede's robustification technique. This technique requires an exponential decrease of the average error.
For a permutation π contained in the symmetric group Π n of permutations of {1, . . . , n}, denote by E π the stochastic encoder obtained from a stochastic encoder E via
Here, π(
Definition 16: A nonnegative number R S is called an enhanced achievable secrecy rate for the CAVWC (W ρ , V)
if there exists a sequence (K n ) ∞ n=1 of (n, J n )-codes and a β > 0 such that
The supremum of all achievable enhanced secrecy rates is called the enhanced secrecy capacity of (W ρ , V) and
Remark 17: Note the difference and the similarities in the definitions ofĈ S,ran (W, V) andĈ S (W ρ , V). The former applies to correlated random codes, the latter to deterministic codes. One will see that the randomness of the former is related to the compound structure of W ρ through the robustification technique. The link is given by the choice of W ρ which will be applied. Permutations of codewords and decoding sets will be seen to provide sufficient correlated randomness. The exponential decrease of error in the definition ofĈ S (W ρ , V) is necessary in order to make up for a polynomial degradation of the error in the blocklength when deterministic CAVWC codes are turned into correlated random AVWC codes.
Theorem 18:
The enhanced secrecy capacityĈ S (W ρ , V) and the secrecy capacity C S (W ρ , V) of the CAVWC
October 30, 2014 DRAFT For any achievable rate R S , a sequence of deterministic (n, J n )-codes K n can be chosen which in addition to (17)-(19) satisfies the following: For every sufficiently large n and every s n ∈ S n , there exist a finite measure Θ s n on C n and a β > 0 such that
It is shown in the next section that (20) implies (19). We need (20) to obtain (14) for correlated random AVWC codes, which should have this property for the proof of Theorem 12.
A remark like Remark 7 applies here as well.
Remark 19: The achievability parts of coding results for compound channels are usually such that they are first done for compound channels with a finite number of states. In a second step, these results are then extended to the arbitrary state set case using an approximation argument. Our requirement that R be a compact set and ρ be continuous restricts the class of possible state sets for CAVWCs. However, this is not necessary, the general case can be treated by the traditional approximation argument as in [6] . Our approach is justified by two arguments.
First, for the special case we restrict ourselves to, it presents an alternative way of approximating the infinite-state compound channel. Second, we mainly consider the CAVWC as a preliminary channel for the AVWC, our main interest. The state set of the CAVWC necessary for this purpose is the compact set P(S) if S is the state set of the AVWC. Further, the mapping associating to every q ∈ P(S) a channel is continuous. Thus, the above requirement is satisfied.
V. THE SECRECY CRITERION, PART I
Theorem 8 follows from Theorem 18 using Ahlswede's robustification technique. In the achievability part of the proof of Theorem 18, we will not directly show that the secrecy criteria (16) or (19) are satisfied. Instead, we apply the following lemma.
Lemma 20: Assume that for every n there exists an (n, J n , Γ n , µ n )-code K ran n , a family of positive measures {Θ s n : s n ∈ P(S)} on C n and an α > 0 such that
Then, with U s n being the channel defined in (15), as n → ∞,
Proof: We only prove the first property, the second is shown in a completely analogous way. Assume we have
the last inequality being true if n is sufficiently large. The uniform continuity of entropy with respect to total variation distance (see [11, Lemma 2.7] ) then implies
which tends to 0 at exponential speed.
In Section IX we give the example of a stochastic encoder and a discrete memoryless channel V satisfying
with a positive constant c. Comparing with (21), it turns out that total variation distance convergence to 0 of order n −1 is the critical speed. If the total variation distance converged at order n −(1+ε) for any ε > 0, then the mutual information between the message and the eavesdropper output would converge to 0 as well.
In the other direction, Pinsker's inequality gives an upper bound on the total variation distance in terms of the mutual information. Hence if the latter tends to 0, then so does the former.
VI. ACHIEVABILITY PART OF THE PROOF OF THEOREM 18
It is sufficient to prove the achievability of R * S (W ρ , V) as an enhanced achievable secrecy rate. An (n, J n )-code should have two properties: it should enable reliable data transmission from A to B and it should ensure that the channel from A to C does not give away too much information. We will show that a randomly selected (n, J n )-code for sufficiently large n and (log J n )/n below R * S (W ρ , V) has these properties with high probability. This will establish the existence of a good (n, J n )-code.
A. Organization of this section
Until Subsection VI-H, we only work to show that
is an enhanced achievable secrecy rate. In Subsection VI-H, we use a standard prefixing argument to show the enhanced achievability of R * S (W ρ , V). We define the method of random selection of (n, J n )-codes K n in Subsection VI-B. The structure of every stochastic encoder is that of a matrix whose entries are codewords. Its columns correspond to messages, i. e. it has J n columns. With a message selected for transmission, an element of the corresponding row of length L n is selected uniformly at random as the codeword to be transmitted.
Subsection VI-C contains the general Chernoff bound and some facts on typical sequences.
In Subsection VI-D, we introduce a modified version of the channel from A to C. For arbitrary π ∈ Π n , we permute the randomly chosen input codewords by π. Then for arbitrary s n , the Chernoff bound is applied to the corresponding output distribution. This serves to find the size L n of the stochastic encoder which is necessary to establish secrecy.
Subsection VI-E treats the following problem: For given input distribution p (corresponding to the random code choice), we want log(L n )/n ≈ max q∈P(S) I(p, V q ). To obtain this bound, it essentially has to be shown that for every message j, permutation π and state sequence s n , the joint type of most permuted input words π(x jl )
(1 ≤ l ≤ L n ) with s n is a product type. In order to ensure this, another application of the Chernoff bound is necessary. This problem is similar to one occurring in coding for AVCs without wiretapper [12] , and close to one occurring in coding for strong secrecy of wiretap multiple-access channels [18] .
In Subsection VI-F, we show that reliable message transmission can be ensured with high probability. As usual, this is done in two steps. First, we define the decoding sets and show reliability for certain finite subsets of the infinite state set. Then an approximation argument is applied (cf. Remark 19).
Having proved that its probability is positive in the previous sections, in Subsection VI-G we choose a code K n which enables reliable transmission over W ρ and which satisfies a kind of secrecy criterion for the modified channel. We show that this code then satisfies the secrecy criterion by reversing the modifications of the channel made in Subsection VI-D and showing that this does not destroy secrecy.
Subsection VI-H contains the prefixing argument necessary to pass from R †
B. Setup of the Random Code Selection
Fix a blocklength n and some p ∈ P(A). To find a good (n, J n )-code, we choose a family of input words
For arbitrary τ > 0, we set
Further, for some δ > 0 to be chosen later, we define
Recall that we use the convention exp(x) = 2 x .
Via X , we obtain a randomly selected (n, J n )-code with encoder E X . Suitable decoding sets {D X j : j ∈ J n } depending on X will be specified in Subsection VI-F. We set
The randomly chosen (n, J n )-code thus obtained is denoted by K X n .
C. Some Preliminaries
The main ingredient for the proof of secrecy is a Chernoff-Hoeffding bound. expectation EZ l = ν, and let 0 < ε <
where
Proof: The proof can be found in [14, Theorem 1.1] and in [3] .
For further bounds, we also need the following well-known facts (cf. [11] ). Here, A, B and the channels W,W are generic sets/stochastic matrices, they do not have to be the sets/stochastic matrices from our AVWC definition.
Lemma 23: Let δ > 0. For every p ∈ P(A) and W : A → P(B) and x n ∈ A n , we have
with c = 1/(2 ln 2). In particular, there is an n 0 = n 0 (|A|, |B|, δ) ≥ 1 such that for each p ∈ P(A) and W : A → P(B)
holds with c ′ = c/2.
Lemma 24: The cardinality of P n 0 (S) is upper-bounded by (n + 1) |S| .
A proof of the next lemma can be found in [5] .
Lemma 25: Let p,p ∈ P(A) and two stochastic matrices W,W : A → P(B) be given. For sufficiently small δ > 0 and any positive integer n,
for allx n ∈ T ñ p,δ holds for a universal f 3 (δ) > 0 with lim n→∞ f 3 (δ) = 0. Note that the right-hand side of (25) does not depend on p nor W , so one might wonder how sharp this bound is. But we will apply the lemma in a case where p =p and where W andW may be close (see Subsection VI-F).
Thus it turns out to give the correct upper bound.
D. Secrecy for a Modified Channel
For π ∈ Π n and x n ∈ A n and j ∈ J n , we write E X ,π (x n |j) := E X (π −1 (x n )|j). Following Lemma 20, our goal is to show that there exists a sequence (ε n ) ∞ n=1 tending to 0 at exponential speed as n tends to infinity such that P E X ,π V n s n ( · |j) − Θ s n ≤ ε n for all j ∈ J n and all π ∈ Π n and all s n ∈ S n is large for sufficiently large n, where Θ s n is a suitable positive measure on C n . Applying the union bound, the probability of the complement of the above event can be upper-bounded by
Note that
This form suggests applying the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound Lemma 21. However, before this can be done in a useful way, the channel V n s n has to be modified. These modifications will be shown to not perturb the channel too much in Subsection VI-G, so that secrecy will also be guaranteed for the original channel.
For some positive α to be chosen later, let ε n := 2 −nα . Fix s n ∈ S n of type q ∈ P n 0 (S) and let π ∈ Π n . For x n ∈ A n , define
where f 2 is the function from Lemma 22. Further, set
Note that the distribution of the family X is identical to the distribution of the family π(X ) := {π(X jl ) : j ∈ J n , l ∈ L n }. This implies in particular that (26) does not depend on π and we can defineΘ s n (z n ) :=Θ s n (z n , id) = Θ s n (z n , π), where id is the identical mapping on {1, . . . , n}. Further define
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which does not depend on π either. Note that by definition, Θ s n (z n ) > 0 only if z n ∈ T n pVq,4|A||S|δ . With the sets just defined, we obtain a modification of V n s n by setting
Note that this is not an actual "channel" as in general z n Q s n ,z n (x n ) < 1. We are now ready to lower-bound the probability of the event
Lemma 26: There exists a τ 2 > 0 such that for every j ∈ J n , z n ∈ C n , s n ∈ S n and π ∈ Π n ,
Proof: Due to the fact that every π(X ) is distributed identically to X , we can assume that π is the identity.
The claim then follows from an application of Lemma 21. Due to the definition of E 1 (x n , s n ), the random variables
Inserting this into the right-hand side of Lemma 21 and recalling the definition of ε n gives the desired bound, with
. This is positive if α and δ are sufficiently small.
E. Sufficiently many good codewords
Note that L n is defined by a maximum over P(S), not over s n or even joint types of s n and input words x n . It is possible to choose L n in this way because we can show for every permutation π of {1, . . . , n}, message j and state sequence s n that there are suffiently many l with
. This is based on two lemmas only concerning the relation between an arbitrary state sequence s n and the family X . It has to be shown that for a given s n , the joint type of most codewords with this state sequence is close to being a product type.
For q ∈ P n 0 (S), let U q : A → P(S) be the channel defined by U q (s|a) = q(s). Lemma 27: For sufficiently large n and every s n of type q,
Proof: Define the stochastic matrix U * p : S → P(A) by U * p (a|s) = p(a). We first show
Let
This proves (27). For n large, we can use this to continue with
where we used (27) in
and Lemma 23 in (iii). The definition of ι 2 in the next lemma is reminiscent of requirement (3.2) in [12] . An analogous definition was made in the setting of the wiretap multiple-access channel [18, Lemma 6] , where the second sender's codewords played to role of the state sequences. The form of this lemma suggests another application of the Chernoff bound Lemma 21.
Lemma 28: For every j ∈ J n , s n ∈ S n and π ∈ Π n , the probability of the complement of the event
is upper-bounded by
for some τ 5 > 0, provided that n is sufficiently large.
Proof: Here we again use the equality of the distributions of X and π(X ) to restrict the proof to the case of π being the identity. Let j ∈ J n . The i.i.d. random variables 1 T n Uq ,2δ (X jl ) (s n ) (l ∈ L n ) are upper-bounded by 1.
Their expectation ν was lower-bounded in Lemma 27 by 1 − 2
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The next two lemmas are connected to the previous one. They are needed when going back from the modified channel Q s n ,z n (x n ) to V s n (z n |x n ). Recall the convention that we sometimes write V (c|a, s) instead of V s (c|a).
Also recall that U q (s|a) = q(s).
Lemma 29: Let x n ∈ T n p,δ and let s n have type q ∈ P
. Thus due to Lemma 22, it suffices to show that if s n has type q, then
For a ∈ A and c ∈ C, we calculate
Corollary 30: If n is sufficiently large, then every s n ∈ S n satisfies
For sufficiently large n
where we used Lemma 29 in (i) and Lemma 23 in (ii). Lemma 27 provides a lower bound on P[s n ∈ T n Uq,2δ (X 11 )], so altogether,
F. Reliability of Message Transmission
The fact that the probability ofē ρ (K X n ) being small is large is well-known, cf. [11] . We give a proof to make the paper self-contained and to draw the reader's attention to two non-standard features of our proof.
First, the receiver does not decode the randomization index l generated by the stochastic encoder. This is unusual for standard wiretap decoding strategies. The present decoding method was developed in [5] . One could actually design the decoder to be able to decode even the randomization index l. However in [5] , an example of a compound wiretap channel with channel state information at the encoder was given where this was not possible.
The second non-standard feature of our proof is the approximation argument used to pass from a compound channel with finitely many states to one with an arbitrary number of states. Cf. Remark 19.
We will first define decoding sets depending on the random family X of codepwords and show that the probability of finding good codes for finite subsets of R is large. Then we need an approximation argument to obtain the statement for R. This exploits the assumptions of R being compact and the continuous dependence of the determining stochastic matrices on the parameter.
Lemma 31: Let R ′ ⊂ R be finite and let Ξ := {ρ(r) : r ∈ R ′ }. Witĥ
, with τ 0 (δ) → 0 as δ > 0, there exists an a = a(τ, δ) > 0 such that the eventι
Proof: For given r ∈ R ′ , we first show an upper bound on the mean error incurred by K X n when ξ is the state. More precisely, setting
we claim
for some a ′ = a ′ (τ, δ) > 0 and for n sufficiently large. The left-hand side of (30) equals
For each of the terms in (31), we have
which by Lemma 23 is upper-bounded by 2 −nc ′ δ the terms in (32), we obtain
For sufficiently large n, the terms on the right-hand side can be written (recall that j = 1)
where we used the definition of p ′ and Lemma 23 in (i). By Lemma 25,
This immediately gives
and we can upper-bound (32) by
If one chooses δ so small that τ ≥ 4f 3 (δ) > 0, this tends to 0 exponentially. Combining the bounds on (31) and (32), we thus obtain (30) for some appropriate a ′ > 0.
Using the Markov inequality and setting a := a ′ /3, we obtain from (30)
October 30, 2014 DRAFT for sufficiently large n. Thus the probability that max ξ∈Ξ e ξ (K X n ) ≤ 2 −na is lower-bounded by 1 − 2 −na . Together with the definition of E X , this completes the proof. Now the complete set {W ρ(r) : r ∈ R} and the corresponding average error is approximated by suitable finite subsets. We do not use the method of [6] , which extends to noncompact state sets R. Instead, we use an alternative approach which exploits the compactness of R.
For r ∈ R and η > 0 define the set
Due to the continuity of ρ, these sets are open. The compactness of R thus implies that there are r 1 , . . . , r N ∈ R such that N i=1 B η (r i ) = R. Now let K n be an (n, J n )-code with stochastic encoder E and decoding sets (D j ) Jn j=1 . Assume that there exists a positive number β such that
Recall the equality p − p ′ = 2 max E∈B |p(E) − p ′ (E)|, which holds for p, p ′ ∈ P(B). We thus have for every i = 1, . . . , N and every r ∈ B η (r i )
As for every r ∈ R there exists an i with r ∈ B η (r i ), we can conclude by the definition of B η (r i ) and Lemma 32 below thatē
Lemma 32: Let W i : A → P(B) (i = 1, 2) be two stochastic matrices satisfying
Proof: The proof goes by induction, we only show the claim for n = 2. For x 2 ∈ A 2 , we have
Altogether, we have proved above the following lemma.
Lemma 33: For the random encoder E X defined in (24), there exist random decoding sets (D X j )
Jn j=1 such that the following is true: For τ ≥ τ 0 (δ), with τ 0 (δ) → 0 as δ > 0, there exists a τ 6 = τ 6 (τ, δ) > 0 such that the event
has probability at least 1 − 2 −nτ6 .
G. Choice of a good realization
Fix τ > 0. Choose α and δ so small that τ 2 from Lemma 26 and τ 5 from Lemma 28 and τ 6 from Lemma 33 are positive. Then for every choice (j, z n , s n , π), the probabilities
at doubly-exponential speed. Now note that there exists a constant c such that |Π n | = n! ≤ cn n for sufficiently large n, which grows faster than exponentially, but not doubly-exponentially. By the union bound,
This tends to 0 in n at exponential speed. We conclude that there exists a realization x := {x jl : j ∈ J n , l ∈ L n } of X which has the following properties: For all j ∈ J n and z n ∈ C n and q ∈ P n 0 (S) and s n ∈ S n and π ∈ Π n ,
where we denote the (n, J n )-code K x n by K n . We will also use the notation E π := E x,π for the corresponding (permuted) stochastic encoder and D j := D x j for the corresponding decoding sets. We now prove that this realization is a good choice for an (n, J n )-code. The property of establishing reliable transmission is (37). The next lemma shows that it is a good choice in terms of secrecy.
Lemma 34: Every code K n satisfying (35) and (36) satisfies
for every j ∈ J n and s n ∈ S n and π ∈ Π n .
Proof: We decompose the total variation distance as follows:
The term in (38) is upper-bounded by ε n , because due to (35)
Next, applying (35) in (i), we upper-bound (39) as
Upon application of Corollary 30, we obtain that (39) can be upper-bounded by
It remains to upper-bound (40). We have
By Lemma 29 and (36), the proportion of those j for which
We can thus bound (41) by
Collecting the bounds on (38), (39) and (40) completes the proof.
Lemma 34 shows that the (n, J n )-code K n satisfies the conditions of Lemma 20. This shows that for every p ∈ P(A) and arbitrarily small τ , (n, J n )-codes exist with J n given by (23), with an exponentially small average error and with max s n max γ I(p Jn , E γ V n s n ) also exponentially small. Thus R † S (W ρ , V) defined in (22) is an achievable enhanced secrecy rate for the CAVWC (W ρ , V).
H. Prefixing more randomness
Here we complete the proof of Theorem 18 by showing that R * S (W ρ , V) is an achievable enhanced secrecy rate of the CAVWC (W ρ , V). Choose a positive integer k. Let U be a finite subset of the positive integers and let U : U → P(A k ) be a stochastic matrix. For every r ∈ R and s k ∈ S k , this induces channels
, and hence, one obtains a CAVWC denoted by (U W k ρ , U V k ). The compound part of this channel also has R as its state set, the state set of the channel to the eavesdropper equals S k . All the above calculations can be performed for this channel in the same way as for the original channel (W ρ , V), and we conclude that
is an achievable enhanced secrecy rate for
We know from the proof that for every ε > 0 and sufficiently large n, one obtains an (n,
whose encoder E * has the form
The decoding sets D * j of K * n are subsets of (B k ) n . Further, we may assume that for some β > 0
Now define the stochastic encoder E :
Together with the decoding sets D * j considered as sets D j ⊂ B kn , this defines a (kn, J n )-code K kn for the CAVWC (W ρ , V). It immediately follows thatē
which tends to 0 in n at exponential speed because k is fixed. J n satisfies
. . , n and let x kn be the
where we applied the definition of E in (i). Hence it follows from (42) that K kn also satisfies the secrecy criterion.
Thus we have shown that
is an achievable enhanced secrecy rate for the CAVWC (W ρ , V). As noted in Remark 6, we can replace
due to the convexity of mutual information in the channel argument. Optimization over U and U : U → P(A k ) now shows that R
VII. PROOF OF THE ACHIEVABILITY PART OF THEOREM 8
Here we apply the achievability statement of Theorem 18 in order to prove a lower bound to the correlated random coding secrecy capacity and the enhanced correlated random coding secrecy capacity of the AVWC (W, V). We apply Theorem 18 to a special CAVWC denoted by (W ♯ , V). Its determining compound part, the family of stochastic matrices describing communication between the sender and the legitimate receiver, is given by {W q : q ∈ P(S)}, where W q := s∈S W s q(s). Note that this family is the range of the continuous mapping ♯ associating to every q ∈ P(S) the matrix W q and that P(S) is a compact set. We thus obtain W ♯ = {W n q : q ∈ P(S), n = 1, 2, . . .}. Observe that for R * S (W, V) defined in (12), we have
Theorem 35: R * S (W, V) is a lower bound toĈ S,ran (W, V), and by Remark 5 also to C S,ran (W, V). The proof of Theorem 35 applies Ahlswede's robustification technique.
Lemma 36 ([2]):
for all q ∈ P n 0 (S) and some
In [4] , this lemma was applied to the compound wiretap channel to obtain a lower bound on the secrecy capacity C S,ran (W, V) of (W, V) for correlated random codes. However, additional assumptions on the AVWC ("best channel to the eavesdropper") were necessary in order to control the information leakage. With the introduction of the CAVWC (W ♯ , V), these additional assumptions are no longer necessary. The effect of Theorem 18 is that robustification is only needed for the reliability part, whereas the secrecy part has already been dealt with. This immediately gives the enhanced secrecy.
Proof of Theorem 35:
Let ε > 0. By Theorem 18 applied to the CAVWC (W ♯ , V), for sufficiently large n, there exist an (n, J n )-code K n and a β > 0 satisfying
We apply Lemma 36 to the function f defined by
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by setting Γ n = Π n and choosing µ n to be the
One has
As the conditions are satisfied, by Lemma 36 one can lower-bound the last term by 1 − (n + 1)
for sufficiently large n. This settles the reliability properties of the code.
Its secrecy properties are immediate, as
VIII. THE CONVERSES
The converse part of Theorem 8 is formulated in the next theorem.
Theorem 37: C S,ran (W, V) andĈ S,ran (W, V), are upper-bounded by R * S (W, V). One unusual difficulty arises in the proof of Theorem 37. This difficulty consists in the fact that the common randomness prohibits a "naive" application of the data processing inequality. It is thus necessary to limit the amount of common randomness of an arbitrary correlated random code in order to overcome this difficulty. This randomness reduction bases on another application of the Chernoff bound and is presented separatelz in the following lemma.
Lemma 38: Let c > 0. For every q ∈ P(S) and s N ∈ S n , let a function I q,s n : Γ n → [0, c] be given. Assume these functions satisfy for every γ ∈ Γ and
if q, q ′ ∈ P(S) satisfy q − q ′ ≤ δ, for some f 5 (δ) which tends to 0 as δ tends to 0. Write µ(I q,s n ) := γ∈Γn µ(γ)I q,s n (γ). Then for every ε > 0, for sufficiently large n (depending on ε, c and |S|), there are L = n
for every q ∈ P(S) and s n ∈ S n .
Proof: It is trivial to note that we only have to prove the converse for C S,ran (W, V). Let 0 < δ < 1/2 and K a positive integer. As in the approximation argument in [6] , one can show that every q ∈ P(S) is at most a distance δ away from some q
Let K be the minimal integer satisfying (45). Then |P
|S| . This approximating set is used to handle the infinite set P(S).
. random variables with values in Γ n and distributed according to µ. Set µ * := min q∈P(S) min s n ∈S µ(I q,s n ). Using the union bound and the Chernoff bound of Lemma 21, we obtain
This probability is smaller than 1 if L tends to infinity faster than n, e.g. if L = n 2 .
Thus we have proved the existence of
for every q ∈ P K 0 (S) and s n ∈ S n . Now let q ∈ P(S) be arbitrary and let
Choosing δ sufficiently small proves the claim of the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 37: Let K ran n be a correlated random (n, J n , Γ n , µ n )-code for (W, V) satisfying
By [11, Lemma 12.3] , the average error incurred by an (n, J n )-code K n transmitted over the AVC W equals the average error of K n over the AVC determined by the convex hull of {W s : s ∈ S}, i. e. the AVC {W n q n : q n ∈ P(S) n , n = 1, 2, . . .}, where
This is a simple consequence of the fact that the average error is affine in the channel, which carries over to correlated random codes. Hence (46) implies
From (48), one infers that the average error of K ran n for transmission over the compound channel W ♯ is upperbounded by ε as well, i. e.
In this proof, we use the random variable representation of entropy and mutual information. Let M be uniformly distributed on J n and let G be distributed according to µ. Let X n be the random codeword, obtained by selecting a message M , a code realization G, and encoding with E G . For every q ∈ P(S) let Y n q be the output corresponding to the compound state q at the legitimate receiver and letM q be the message the intended receiver decides for upon receiving Y n q using the decoding rule of the code realization G. For every state sequence s n ∈ S n , let Z n s n be the corresponding output at the eavesdropper. The joint distributions P MGX n Y n qM q and P MGX n Z n s n are given by
Due to Fano's inequality [11, Lemma 3.8] , (49) implies for every q ∈ P(S)
Hence the independence of M and G yields
so by rearranging and taking (47) into account, we have for every q ∈ P(S) and s n ∈ S
. On account of Lemma 2.7 in [11] , the special structure of these functions and the continuity of entropy yield for every q, q ′ ∈ P(S) with q − q ′ ≤ 1/2,
The right-hand side tends to zero as the total variation distance tends to zero. Thus Lemma 38 can be applied,
In order to prove the converse, we have to get rid of G ′ in some way. The only reasonable way to achieve this seems to be through the use of the convexity of the mutual information in the channel argument. But while this is a valid choice for the "secrecy term", it is certainly invalid for the "legal" term. This is due to the fact that G is independent of M , but not ofM q or Y n q . An application of the data processing inequality is thus only possible conditioned on G ′ . But as we have bounded the size of the range of G ′ , we can write
where we employed the fact that H(S) ≤ H(S, T ) = H(S|T ) + H(T ). Thus if n is sufficiently large, we obtain
The joint distributions
have the form required in the definition of R * S (W, V), the shared randomness is now completely reduced to randomness at the encoder. This completes the proof of Theorem 37.
Thus Theorem 8 is proved. We still need to prove the converse for Theorem 18. But the above converse almost literally carries over to CAVWCs (W ρ , V). The analog to Theorem 37 for the CAVWC stated below thus also completes the proof of Theorem 18. The analysis of an example constructed by Bloch and Barros in [7] shows that the requirement that the variational distance between output distribution and conditional output distribution given any message tend to zero is strictly weaker than the requirement that mutual information tend to zero. First we state it as in [7] , which is not a memoryless situation. Then we show how the example can be embedded into a memoryless setting.
Let n be a nonnegative integer. Let M n = (M 1 , . . . , M n ) be uniformly distributed on {0, 1} n . M n is the random message. It is coded into a codeword X n = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) using a secret key K n = (K 1 , . . . , K n ) independent of M n by setting
Let K n have the following distribution P K n :
Bloch and Barros show that this scheme is weakly secure, i. e. that
On the other hand, they also show that I(M n ∧X n ) ≥ 1 2 for n sufficiently large. We will now show that
The conditional distribution of X n given M n equals P X n |M n (x n |m n ) = 1 n 1 {m n } (x n ) + 1 − 1 n 2 n − 1 x n =m n 1 {x n } (x n ).
Due to symmetry, X n is uniformly distributed on {0, 1} n . Thus
This tends to zero. Note that
Inspection of the proof of Lemma 20 shows that P X n − P X n |M n tends to zero at a critical speed: if it converged to zero faster than 1/n, then one could apply the technique from Section V and conclude that I(M n ∧ X n ) tends to zero as well.
A translation into our memoryless setting is as follows: Let the AVWC (W, V) be defined by A = B = {0, 1} × {0, 1} and C = {0, 1}. We set |S| = 1 (no jamming is allowed) and define W to be the identity on A, i. e.
Bob gets full information. On the other hand, V transmits the first component of the input perfectly and "forgets" the second component, meaning that V (c|a 1 , a 2 ) = 1 {a1} (c) for (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ A and c ∈ C.
Then the legitimate parties' strategy is as follows: Choose as the message set the set M n := {0, 1} n . The randomized encoder E maps the message encrypted by the key to the first component of the channel input and the key to the second component, so
The decoding consists of the sets D m n := {(x n , k n ) : x n = m n ⊕ k n }. The average error is
but Eve's output given that m n was sent is described by the probability distribution (EV n )(·|m n ) given by the values (EV n )(c n |m
= P(X n = c n |M n = m n ).
Thus, letting the uniform drawing of the messages be described by the random variable M n , the mutual information I(p Mn , EV n ) = I(M n ∧ X n ) > 1/2 by the results of Bloch and Barros. On the other hand and by the very same calculation, EV n − EV n (·|m) → 0.
The above described coding scheme can thus be used to send information securely with respect to the variational distance between the distribution of X n and that of X n given m n for every message m n ∈ M n at a rate R = 1, but it is not secure with respect to the strong secrecy criterion.
X. MODEL ROBUSTNESS AND CONTINUITY
Here we discuss how robust the AVWC model is with respect to variations of the underlying channel set.
As discussed in the introduction, this question is also connected to the jammer's power. Small variations in the underlying model might change the effect of the jammer's actions dramatically.
More precisely, in this section we investigate the continuity properties of the deterministic and correlated random capacities as functions of (W, V). Of course, the set of AVWCs with given in-and output alphabets has to be equipped with a metric for such an investigation. This is what we start with.
Let (W, V) and (W,Ṽ) be two AVWCs with input alphabet A and output alphabets B, C for the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively. Denote the finite state space of (W, V) by S and the finite state space of (W,Ṽ) byS. We measure the distance of (W, One checks easily that this is an actual metric on the set of finite-state AVWCs with the corresponding alphabets A, B, C.
Building on Theorem 8, we now state the central result concerning the continuity of the correlated random capacities. is shown. The latter quantity has been shown in [5] to be the capacity of the corresponding compound wiretap channel.
The question of continuity of the deterministic capacity C S (W, V) is more intricate. As the deterministic coding secrecy capacity is as yet unknown and a-priori approaches are not viable, it is impossible to give the final answer.
It would be desirable to have results like the one in [8] , which characterizes the points of discontinuity of the deterministic coding capacity function of Arbitrarily Varying Quantum Channels (AVQCs). What we can say here is the following.
Theorem 41: The function C S (·, ·) is continuous on both the set C = := {(W, V) : C S (W, V) = 0} and on the set C > := {(W, V) : C S (W, V) > 0}. Thus, any point of discontinuity has to lie on the boundary between these two sets.
Proof:
The continuity on C = is trivial. The continuity on C > is due to Theorem 12 and the continuity of In addition to the above lower bounds, we can choose n so large that the above chain of inequalities results in log L + log J n m + n ≥ R S − 2ε.
It is easy to see that e(K * m+n ) ≤ δ + ε. Next, observe that p L ⊗ p Jn is the uniform distribution on {1, . . . , L} × {1, . . . , J n }. Let s
We also have C S,ran (W, V) ≥ C weak S (W, V). This is due to the fact that the converses carry over to the case where all secrecy criteria are weak, including those for correlated random coding. Thus C weak S (W, V) is upperbounded by the largest achievable rate for the weak secrecy criterion and correlated random coding, which is the same as C S,ran (W, V). This proves the claim of Remark 13.
